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THE INSPECTOR KNOCKS: ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTION
WARRANTS UNDER AN EXPANDED FOURTH AMENDMENT*
by
Michael R. Sonnenreich"*
and Robert G. Pinco* **
0N JULY 14, 1969, President Nixon sent to the Congress a compre-
hensive message on drug abuse.1 That message set forth a ten-point
plan for combating the expanded increase of drug abuse in the United
States. The second point of the message states:
To more effectively meet the narcotic and dangerous drug problems at the
Federal level, the Attorney General is forwarding to the Congress a compre-
hensive legislative proposal to control these drugs. This measure will place
in a single statute, a revised and modern plan for control. Current laws in
this field are inadequate and outdated.
I consider the legislative proposal a fair, rational and necessary approach
to the total drug problem .... [T]his proposal creates a more flexible mech-
anism which will allow quicker control of new dangerous drugs before their
misuse and abuse reach epidemic proportions. I urge the Congress to take
favorable action on this bill.!
The following day the Administration introduced into Congress the
Controlled. pzgerous SubstancesA t of 1969.' That bill, in addition to
unifying the fifty public laws which have been promulgated by Congress
in the narcotics and dangerous drugs field since 1914, added several new
features relating to search and seizure. Because of the complexity and
somewhat controversial nature of one of these features, administrative
inspection warrants,4 it is believed that a thorough, in-depth explanation
* The views expressed herein are not necessarily the views of the Department of Justice in
general, or the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in particular.
** A.B., University of Wisconsin; Cert. of Matriculation, University of Madrid; J.D., Harvard
University. Deputy Chief Counsel, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and instrumental in
drafting the proposed legislation.
*** B.S.Ph., University of Connecticut School of Pharmacy; J.D., Georgetown University.
Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
' MESSAGE TO CONGRESS FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TRANSMITTING PRO-
POSALS FOR COMBATTING DRUG ABUSE, JULY 14, 1969, H.R. Doc. No. 91-138, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969).
2 Id. at 2.
'The bill was introduced as S. 2637, but passed the Senate on Jan. 28, 1970, as S. 3246 by
a vote of 82-0.
'ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS AND WARRANTS. Sec. 703.
(a) Issuance and Execution of Administrative inspection warrants shall be as follows:
(1) Any judge of the United States or of a State court of record, or any United
States Magistrate may, within his jurisdiction, and upon proper oath or affirma-
tion showing probable cause, issue warrants for the purpose of conducting ad-
ministrative inspections of controlled premises authorized by this Act or regu-
lations thereunder, and seizures of property appropriate to such inspections.
For the purposes of this section, 'probable cause' means a valid public interest
in the effective enforcement of the Act or regulations sufficient to justify ad-
ministrative inspection of the area, premises, building or conveyance in the cir-
cumstances specified in the application for the warrant.
(2) A warrant shall issue only upon an affidavit of an officer or employee duly desig-
nated and having knowledge of the facts alleged, sworn to before the judge or
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of that provision would be timely. It is the intent of this Article to review
the historical precedents, and then to focus on the administrative inspection
warrant section in the new drug legislation. That section contains the first
serious statutory proposals for administrative inspection warrants since the
magistrate and establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant. If the judge or
magistrate is satisfied that grounds for the application exist or that there is
probable cause to believe they exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the
area, premises, building, or conveyance to be inspected, the purpose for such
inspection, and, where appropriate, the type of property to be inspected, if any.
The warrant shall identify the item or types of property to be seized, if any.
The warrant shall be directed to a person authorized by section 701 to execute
it. The warrant shall state the grounds for its issuance and the name of the
person or persons whose affidavit has been taken in support thereof. It shall com-
mand the person to whom it is directed to inspect the area, premises, building,
or conveyance identified for the purpose specified, and, where appropriate, shall
direct the seizure of the property specified. The warrant shall direct that it be
served during normal business hours. It shall designate the judge or magistrate
to whom it shall be returned.
(3) A warrant issued pursuant to this section must be executed and returned within
ten days of its date. If property is seized pursuant to a warrant, the person
executing the warrant shall give to the person from whom or from whose
premises the property was taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for
the property taken or shall leave the copy and receipt at the place from which
the property was taken. The return of the warrant shall be made promptly
and shall be accompanied by a written inventory of any property taken. The
inventory shall be made in the presence of the person executing the warrant and
of the person from whose possession or premises the property was taken, if they
are present, or in the presence of at least one credible person other than the per-
son making such inventory, and shall be verified by the person executing the
warrant. The judge or magistrate, upon request, shall deliver a copy of the in-
ventory to the person from whom or from whose premises the property was
taken and to the applicant for the warrant.
(4) The judge or magistrate who has issued a warrant under this section shall at-
tach to the warrant a copy of the return and all papers filed in connection
therewith and shall file them with the clerk of the district court of the United
States for the judicial district in which the inspection was made.
(b) The Attorney General is authorized to make administrative inspections of controlled
premises in accordance with the following provisions:
(1) For purposes of this title only, 'controlled premises' means:
(a) places where persons registered or exempted from registration requirements
under this Act are required to keep records; and
(b) places including factories, warehouses, establishments, and conveyances
where persons registered or exempted from registration requirements under
this Act are permitted to hold, manufacture, compound, process, sell, de-
liver, or otherwise dispose of any controlled dangerous substance.
(2) When so authorized by an administrative inspection warrant issued pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section, an officer or employee designated by the Attorney
General, upon presenting the warrant and appropriate credentials to the owner,
operator, or agent in charge, shall have the right to enter controlled premises
for the purpose of conducting an administrative inspection.
(3) When so authorized by an administrative inspection warrant, an officer or em-
ployee designated by the Attorney General shall have the right-
(a) to inspect and copy records required by this Act to be kept;
(b) to inspect, within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, controlled
premises and all pertinent equipment, finished and unfinished material,
containers and labeling found therein, and, except as provided in subsection
(b) (5) of this section, all other things therein (including records, files,
papers, processes, controls, and facilities) bearing on violation of this Act;
and
(c) to inventory any stock of any controlled dangerous substance therein and
obtain samples of any such substance.
(4) This section shall not be construed to prevent the inspection without a warrant
of books and records pursuant to an administrative subpoena.issued in accordance
with section 606 of this Act, nor shall this section be construed to prevent en-
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landmark decisions of Camara v. Municipal Court' and See v. City of
Seattle.' It is apparent that if the section is approved by the Congress and
accepted by the Supreme Court, it will pave the way for a general federal
administrative inspection warrant statute.
Search and seizure problems arising under the fourth amendment7 have
proved most vexing to scholars of the Constitution, judges, and law en-
forcement personnel. Justice Frankfurter once described the case law in-
terpreting the fourth amendment by stating that "the course of true law
pertaining to search and seizure has not-to put it mildly-run smooth."'
In the minds of many people, the fits, spurts, and occasional digressions
into the land of Oz that characterize the case law of search and seizure
have not created a reasonable development of this area, or a development
that can be relied upon with any certainty or constancy. It is fair comment
to say that the history of decision-making in this field has been at times
inconsistent, at times difficult to interpret, and at times an exasperating
experience.
Nowhere has this inconsistency been more evident than in the course of
decisions relating to administrative inspections by public health and safety
officials. These decisions, which have spanned a period of over 200 years,
represent a constantly changing attitude toward the nature of such inspec-
tions. Whether government administrative inspections are civil, quasi-
criminal, or criminal in nature, and whether penalties which arise from
failure to accede to such searches are civil or quasi-criminal in nature are
points that have been debated by leading jurists up to the present day.'
tries and administrative inspections (including seizures of property) without a
warrant-
(a) with the consent of the owner, operator, or agent in charge of the con-
trolled premises;
(b) in situations presenting imminent danger to health or safety;
(c) in situations involving inspection of conveyances where there is reasonable
cause to believe that the mobility of the conveyance makes it impracticable
to obtain a warrant;
(d) in any other exception or emergency circumstance where time or oppor-
tunity to apply for a warrant is lacking; and
(e) in all other situations where a warrant is not constitutionally required.
(5) Except when the owner, operator, or agent in charge of the controlled premises
so consents in writing, no inspection authorized by this section shall extend to-
(a) financial data;
(b) sales data other than shipment data; or
(c) pricing data.
Proposed Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, S. 3246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 703 (1970).
5387 U.S. 523 (1967).
6387 U.S. 541 (1967).
'U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
' Quoted in Speech by John F. Atkinson, National Association of Boards of Pharmacy Annual
Meeting, May 6, 1968.
' E.g., Comment, Administrative Inspection Procedures Under the Fourth Amendment-Ad-
ministrative Probable Cause, 32 ALBANY L. Ruev. 155 (1967); Comment, Administrative Inspection






Two opposing views on administrative procedures have juxtaposed each
other in the American courts since the mid-nineteenth century." One view
is that Entick v. Carrington," the early English case upon which all recent
American decisions hinge, never contemplated the constitutional basis upon
which the American judicial system lavishes so much attention. Other
courts have argued that such cases as: Entick, whether resting upon English
or American constitutional law, are so fundamental to our legal thinking
as to be ageless in their meaning and intent, and that the mere span of time
has not removed the need to guard individual rights of privacy in adminis-
trative inspections. These latter courts have viewed all governmental in-
spections, whether they were by the agents of the Crown in 1765 or by
state building or health inspectors in 1970, as being substantially similar.
Either view may be plausibly supported by reference to the classic Eng-
lish case of Entick v. Carrington, usually cited as the starting point for any
discussion in this area.12 This case involved issuance of a general warrant by
the secretary of state in order to seize an allegedly libelous pamphlet. Lord
Camden, who announced what was to become a basic principle of English
and American law, held that the basic concept of common law did not
allow officers of the Crown to break into a citizen's home under cover of a
general executive warrant to search for evidence of the utterance of libel.
Whatever Lord Camden actually meant by holding that the state had
no authority to search for and seize an individual's private papers on mere
suspicion of "libel" probably will never be known with any real degree of
certainty. If he meant that "as the common law withheld from all the
right to search for and seize evidence to support a civil action, so [the
court intended to withhold] from Crown and commoner a similar right in
relation to a criminal prosecution,"" then the rationale applied in the land-
mark American cases of Boyd v. United States ' and Frank v. Maryland,"
which distinguish the protection of the fourth amendment in civil versus
criminal searches and seizures, is logical and reasonable."0 However, if Lord
Camden meant that with the exception of a search for stolen goods, all
searches by government officials authorized by general warrants or writs of
assistance were per se unreasonable regardless of the limitations or checks
"°Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); United States v. Three Tons of Coal, 28 F.
Cas. 149 (No. 16,515) (E.D. Wis. 1875); United States v. Distillery No. Twenty Eight, 25 F.
Cas. 868 (No. 14,966) (D. Ind. 1875); In re Strouse, 23 F. Cas. 261, 262 (No. 13,548) (D.
Nev. 1871); In re Platt, 19 F. Cas. 815 (No. 11,212) (S.D.N.Y. 1874); In re Meador, 16 F.
Cas. 1294, 1299 (No. 9,375) (N.D. Ga. 1869).
" 19 Howell's State Trials Col. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
" Comment, Administrative Inspection Procedures Under the Fourth Amendment-Administra-
tive Probable Cause, 32 ALBANY L. REv. 155, 156 n.5 (1967).
1 Waters, Rights of Entry in Administrative Officers, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 79, 81 (1959).
14116 U.S. 616 (1886).
'5359 U.S. 360 (1959).
" Comment, Administrative Inspection Without a Warrant: Camara v. Municipal Court and
See v. Seattle, 42 CONN. B.J. 255, 257 (1968).
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which may have been imposed upon them," then Entick fully supports'"
the District of Columbia court of appeals in District of Columbia v. Lit-
tle," the dissent of Justice Douglas in Frank v. Maryland,' and the deci-
sions in Camara v. Municipal Cour' and See v. City of Seattle." Whatever
Lord Camden's original intent might have been, this classic English consti-
tutional case has created a major conflict in the American case law as to
the applicability of the fourth amendment to administrative inspection
searches and seizures where harsh civil or quasi-criminal penalties are in-
voked.
B. Early American Cases
Just before the Entick decision, a substantially similar case was decided
in what was then the colony of Massachusetts. This case, now referred to as
Paxton's Case,2 involved an attempt by agents of the collector of customs
to use the notorious writs of assistance, which allowed unlimited powers of
search for evidence of a crime, to enforce collection of the cider tax, which
was a civil, rather than a criminal, matter. James Otis, the former Massa-
chusetts advocate general who had resigned that post rather than defend
the Writs of Assistance, argued that such writs had the effect of abridging
an individual's common law right to privacy. 4 Both Entick and Paxton
have often been referred to as the cases that greatly influenced the adoption
of the fourth amendment."
No further cases of significance were reported until around the 1860's
and 70's when a series of lower court federal cases held the fourth amend-
ment to apply only to criminal cases and not to civil forfeitures. But
these cases were all negated in 1886 by Boyd v. United States,7 which held
that the fourth amendment applied to forfeiture proceedings which the
Court considered as having been converted to criminal actions in substance,
even though they were couched in the form of civil proceedings by lower
federal courts. Boyd involved a statute which authorized a government
agency to require a businessman to produce any books, invoices, and papers
which would tend to prove any allegation made by the United States that
" Comment, State Health Inspections and "Unreasonable Search": The Frank Exclusion of
Civil Searches, 44 MINN. L. REV. 513, 526 n.51 (1960).18See also Comment, note 16 supra, at 257 n.19.
'9 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
20359 U.S. 360, 374 (1959).
2"387 U.S. 523 (1967).
2 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
2Quincy's Mass. Rep. 51 (1761).
14See Comment, Warrantless Administrative Inspections, Although for the General Welfare,
Are Violative of the Fourth Amendment, 37 CINC. L. REV. 243, 244 n.7 (1968).
25 See Comment, note 16 supra, at 258 n.20. See also Comment, note 24 supra, at 245.
'6 See Comment, note 12 supra, at 157 n.13.
'7116 U.S. 616 (1886).
21 Compare Boyd with the deportation cases which, although they are civil in nature, apply
those constitutional guarantees afforded to U.S. citizens in criminal matters to resident aliens:
Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S.
590 (1953); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189
U.S. 86 (1903). See also Stansic v. United States Imm. & Nat. Serv., 393 F.2d 539 (9th Cir.
1968), and Klissas v. United States Imm. & Nat. Serv., 361 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1966), which
allude to the fact that such constitutional guarantees may also apply to non-resident aliens.
[Vol. 24
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the defendant had in fact violated the revenue laws. On April 7, 1874,
E. A. Boyd and Sons received a shipment of plate glass from Liverpool,
England, through the port of New York. An information was filed by the
United States District Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
alleging an attempt to defraud the Collector of Revenue, and asking for
relief in the form of seizure and forfeiture of the thirty-five cases of glass.
Under protest, E. A. Boyd and Sons supplied the invoices for the glass as
required by statute. On the basis of the invoices, the jury found for the
United States, and the glass was forfeited. Although the seizure was
couched in terms of a civil proceeding, a violation of the statute carried
with it not only a forfeiture, but also a fine of up to $5,000 and a prison
sentence of up to two years. The Supreme Court held that the alleged
civil penalties imposed by the customs laws had been converted in substance
to criminal penalties, and thus the seizures in question were in violation of
the fourth amendment. The Court reasoned that compulsory production of
a private individual's papers to be used as evidence against him was tanta-
mount to compelling him to be a witness against himself in violation of
the fifth amendment. Thus, the Court held that when the very thing for-
bidden in the fifth amendment-compelling a man to be a witness against
himself-is itself the object of a search or seizure, then the search or
seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment.2" As
the fifth amendment is only applicable to criminal cases, the somewhat
questionable nexus between the fourth and fifth amendments set forth by
the Court in Boyd was to become the basis for strong contention that Boyd
and Entick only applied to criminal matters. Thus, it has been reasoned by
extrapolation that the fourth amendment applies only to criminal searches
and seizures." Even as the Supreme Court set forth Boyd, it considered that
the problem had long been settled. Referring to Entick v. Carrington, the
Court stated:
Lord Camden pronounced the judgment of the court in Michaelmas term,
1765, and the law as expounded by him, has been regarded as settled from
that time to this, and his great judgment on that occasion is considered as
one of the landmarks of English liberty. It was welcomed and applauded
by the lovers of liberty in the colonies as well as in the mother country. It
is regarded as one of the permanent monuments of the British constitution,
and is quoted as such by the English authorities on that subject down to the
present time.
As every American statesman, during our revolutionary and formative
period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this monument of English
freedom, and considered it as the true and ultimate expression of constitutional
law, it may be confidently asserted that its propositions were in the minds
of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were
considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable
searches and seizures."
29 116 U.S. at 641.
"0Contra, Comment, note 12 supra, at 157-58. See also Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959).
3' 116 U.S. at 626-27.
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After Boyd, it was generally considered settled that the fourth amend-
ment applied solely to criminal proceedings, and that civil administrative
inspections, searches, and seizures were not within the purview of its
protection. In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co." and lower federal court cases
relating to civil searches generally,"3 and to the Food and Drug Act 4 spe-
cifically," the fourth amendment was held not to apply.
During the period from Flint in 1911, until Frank v. Maryland"6 in 1959,
a trend toward a much broader interpretation of the fourth amendment
developed. This trend, generally seen in dicta, began to set the stage for
fourth amendment interpretations which would restrict civil, as well as
quasi-criminal, governmental inspections, searches, and seizures.'
In 1949 the District of Columbia court of appeals held the fourth
amendment to apply to both civil and criminal proceedings in District of
Columbia v. Little." The case involved the defendant's refusal to unlock
her front door at the command of a health department inspector who was
without a search warrant. Judge Prettyman, rejecting the Boyd nexus be-
tween the fourth and fifth amendments, held that the fourth amendment
alone was broad enough to protect the rights of an individual home owner
against warrantless intrusions by government officials." He reasoned that
"the prohibition against searches was not protection against self-incrimina-
tion; it was the common-law right of a man to privacy in his home, a right
[protected by the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches, and] which is one of the indispensable ultimate essentials of our
concept of civilization."' Referring to the narrowness of the fourth
32220 U.S. 107 (1911). Citing Boyd, the Court stated:
It is urged in a number of the cases that in a certain feature of the statute there is
a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, protecting against un-
reasonable searches and seizures. This Amendment was adopted to protect against
abuses in judicial procedure under the guise of law, which invade the privacy of
persons in their homes, papers and effects, and applies to criminal prosecutions and
suits for penalties and forfeitures under the revenue laws. . . . It does not prevent
the issuing of process to require attendance and testimony of witnesses, the produc-
tion of books and papers, etc."
Id. at 174-75.
" United States v. 62 Packages, 48 F. Supp. 878, 884 (W.D. Wis. 1943), aff'd, 142 F.2d 107
(7th Cir. 1944).
3421 U.S.C. §§ 321a-321c (1964).
"United States v. Eighteen Cases of Tuna Fish, 5 F.2d 979 (W.D. Va. 1925).
"359 U.S. 360 (1959).
m The principal authority for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment is not limited
in application is that the United States Supreme Court has made many statements
to the effect that the Fourth Amendment is to be broadly interpreted. For example,
in Weeks v. United States, [232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914)], the Court said, 'The
effect of the Fourth Amendment is . . . to forever secure the people, their persons,
houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise
of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not .... .
In Agnello v. United States, [269 U.S. 20 (1925)], it was stated that 'it has always
been assumed that one's house cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant
except as an incident to a legal arrest . . . . The protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment extends to all equally,-to those justly suspected or accused, as well as to the
innocent. The search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable
and abhorrent to our laws.'
Comment, note 12 supra, at 558. See also Comment, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ADMINISTRATIVE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, 7 WASHBURN L.J. 385, 388 (1968).
s 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
9 178 F.2d at 16.40Id. at 16-17.
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amendment protection as given by the Boyd and Flint cases, he stated:
"To say that a man suspected of crime has a right to protection against
search of his home without a warrant, but that a man not suspected of a
crime has no such protection, is a fantastic absurdity."41
It should be noted that although Little was only an appellate case, it was
the first case expressly applying the fourth amendment to administrative
inspections.' Little contained a thread that bound all later inspection cases.
That thread-"the fear of uncontrolled, oppressive police-type actions,
undertaken by the agent in the field, without review by higher headquar-
ters or by an impartial reviewing authority""a-has been repeated in all the
inspection cases.
Yet, even as Judge Prettyman set forth what was eventually to become
the view of the Supreme Court, he was opposed by Judge Holtzoff, who,
in his dissent, advocated the continued non-applicability of the fourth
amendment in civil searches. Judge Holtzoff cited Entick v. Carrington,
Boyd v. United States, United States v. Eighteen Cases of Tuna Fish," and
United States v. 62 Packages' as the bases for his reasoning." Unfortu-
nately, Judge Holtzoff's dissenting view was sustained by the Supreme
Court, not in Little, which it affirmed on other grounds, ' but in Frank v.
Maryland,48 decided in May 1959.
The Frank case involved a warrantless health inspection of Aaron Frank's
home based on a complaint of a nearby resident. A Baltimore City statute
imposed a twenty-dollar forfeiture for each refusal to allow an authorized
inspector entry.' The inspector had no authority to force entry, but each
refusal subjected the homeowner to another fine."° Frank was arrested,
tried, and fined the requisite twenty dollars. On appeal, he was granted a
trial de novo, at which he was again convicted. Certiorari was refused by
the Maryland court of appeals"' but was granted by the Supreme Court."2
In a five-to-four decision,"3 the Court upheld Frank's conviction. The
Court agreed that the fourth amendment guaranteed the individual's right
to be secure from unauthorized intrusions by government officials into his
"cpersonal privacy," and it agreed that the individual has the right to resist
41Id. at 17.
42See Comment, note 16 supra, at 258.
"Gottlieb, Inspection Bounds and the Constitution, 32 ASS'N Os FOOD & DRUG OFFICIALS
Q.B., Oct. 1968, at 183.
445 F.2d 979 (W.D. Va. 1925).
448 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Wis. 1943).
46 178 F.2d at 23.
47 See note 38 supra.
48359 U.S. 360 (1959).
"Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists
in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in the day time, and if the owner
or occupier shall refuse or delay to open the same and admit a free examination, he shall forfeit
and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty Dollars." BALTIMORE, MD., CITY COnE art. 12,
§ 120.
" Waters, note 13 supra, at 88, which contends that the Baltimore ordinance was intended to
authorize forcible entry.
5359 U.S. at 362.
52358 U.S. 863 (1958).
"3 The majority consisted of Justices Stewart, Clark, Harlan, and Frankfurter, who wrote the
opinion of the Court. Justice Whittaker wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Douglas wrote the
dissent, and was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Brennan.
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an unauthorized entry for the purpose of securing evidence of criminal
action." However, it distinguished the inspection situation from the gather-
ing of evidence for the purposes of demonstrating criminal activity. The
Court stated that municipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs
"touch at most upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded
by the [fourth amendment as applied through the] fourteenth amend-
ment's protection against official intrusion . . . ." Using a balancing-of-
interests test, the Court weighed "the nature of the demand being made
on individual freedom . . . [against] the justification of social need on
which the demand rests. '' "6 It went on to find that such administrative in-
spections were merely to determine whether the physical conditions which
existed complied with the minimum standards set forth by local ordinances,
and that inspections to disclose those conditions were "hedged about with
safeguards designed to make the least possible demand on the individual
occupant, and to cause only the slightest restriction on his claims of pri-
vacy." The Court reviewed at length the historical background of the
fourth amendment,"8 and concluded that the searches from which the
framers of the Constitution had sought to protect the citizenry were those
in which goods were subject to confiscation, or the primary purpose was to
seek evidence of a crime. Touching upon the "reasonableness" aspect of
administrative inspections, the majority seemed to require some "cause" for
suspicion in order to render an inspection constitutionally reasonable. How-
ever, the final determination of such "cause" was left in the total discretion
of the inspector himself. The Court justified this view by pointing to the
long history of public acceptance of such warrantless inspections and to
their importance in protecting the interests of society. " In Frank Justice
Douglas' dissent "° closely followed the holding in Little."1 He was sharply
critical of nearly all of the premises laid down as the basis for the majority
opinion. Setting forth several propositions to justify the inclusion of admin-
istrative inspections by health and safety officials within the restrictions of
the fourth amendment, he argued that distinctions between criminal and
civil searches were invalid because the failure to abate the nuisance usually
gave rise to criminal prosecution. He reasoned that except in emergency
situations, decisions to invade an individual's right of privacy should be
made by an impartial judicial officer, and not be subject to the whim of
the administrative official out in the field. These arguments were later to
be cited with approval by the majority in Camara v. Municipal Court,"5
which overruled the Frank decision.
Shortly after the decision in Frank v. Maryland, the Court again ad-
54359 U.S. at 365. See also Comment, note 12 supra, at 160.
5 359 U.S. at 367. See also Comment, note 12 supra, at 160.
541 TEMPLE L.Q. 134, 136 (1967).
57359 U.S. at 367.
5 It should be noted that the Court quoted extensively from Boyd and also cited Entick as
a basis for its belief that the fourth amendment was intended only to apply to criminal situations.
59359 U.S. at 371.
80 See note 53 sufra.
61 See note 39 supra, and accompanying text.
62387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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dressed itself to the problem of administrative searches in Eaton v. Price."'
The closeness of the two decisions represented in part a move by the dis-
senters to embarrass the majority." Also, the dissenters knew that because
a member of the Frank majority, Justice Stewart, would almost certainly
disqualify himself, the way would be paved for a tie vote on the issue.'
Factually, Eaton v. Price was similar to Frank, except in Frank a half-ton
of straw, trash, and rat feces were found in the defendant's yard and a
neighbor complained of dead rats," while in Eaton there was no reason
to believe that there had been a violation of the health codes on the prem-
ises of the defendant."7 In Eaton habeas corpus had been denied a home
owner arrested for refusing to allow a housing inspector to search without
a warrant. The inspector's request was not based on a complaint, nor was
it part of an area-wide inspection. Not only was the inspector unable to
show the credentials required by the statute the first two times he knocked
on the door, but he was also unable to give any valid reason to justify
his search. In his dissent, Justice Brennan suggested that the inspection was
the result of either "personal or political spite,"" or a whim of the inspec-
tor. Instead of creating a conflicting decision, the Court held Frank v.
Maryland to be controlling and merely reaffirmed it to make it abundantly
clear to the dissenters that the Frank decision was not an anomaly. How-
ever, since the "probable cause" element found in Frank was almost non-
existent in Eaton, the latter case represented a broadening of the Frank
doctrine.
From Eaton in 1950, until Camara v. Municipal Court"e in 1967, the
High Court did not consider the constitutionality of warrantless adminis-
trative inspections by government officials. Yet several incidents occurred
which signaled a change in the attitude of the Court. First, Justice Douglas
had argued in Frank that such warrantless inspections might be used by
police in collusion with inspectors to search for evidence of a crime." Such
a threat became reality in Maryland v. Pettiford," in which a police officer,
attached to the Baltimore Sanitation Department, gained entrance to a
residence ostensibly to conduct a health inspection, but in reality to secure
evidence of a lottery. The seized lottery slips were admitted over the ob-
jection of the defendant in a criminal trial, and he was convicted. 72 Al-
though the conviction was: later reversed on appeal, Justice, Douglas cited
the Pettiford case in 1960, in Abel v. United States,3 to show the kind of
problem which the Frank doctrine had generated.
0364 U.S. 263 (1960).
429 MONT. L. REv. 81, 84 n.17 (1967).
" Justice Stewart's father was a member of the Ohio supreme court that had decided Eaton
v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958).
'6359 U.S. at 361.
07 364 U.S. at 270-71.
6' Id. at 271.
09387 U.S. 523 (1967).
'0359 U.S. at 374.
"Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, Daily Record (Dec. 16, 1959).
"aThe evidence was later suppressed on appeal by the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, and
the conviction was reversed.
1a 362 U.S. 217, 243 & n.2 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
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The second signal was a change in the composition of the Court. Justices
Whittaker and Frankfurter were replaced by Justices White and Fortas,"4
so that the Court was composed of a greater number of individuals with a
more liberal view towards the application of the Constitution in cases in-
volving confrontations of private citizens with government officials."
C. Recent American Developments
By the mid-sixties, the changes in the personnel of the Court had already
become evident in the line of decisions which flowed from the bench. So, it
was no surprise when on June 5, 1967, the Court handed down the twin
decisions of Camara v. Municipal Court" and See v. City of Seattle," ex-
pressly overruling Frank v. Maryland.
The Camara case involved an annual area health inspection of apartment
houses. An inspector was informed that the plaintiff was using the rear por-
tion of his rental unit as his personal residence and not as a store, contrary
to the building's occupancy permit. The inspector made three unsuccessful
attempts to inspect the premises without a search warrant. After the plain-
tiff failed to honor a citation to appear at the district attorney's office, a
complaint was filed in municipal court by the city, charging the plaintiff
with a misdemeanor in violating the San Francisco Municipal Code. 8 After
a series of appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 9 The Court, in a
six-to-three decision, held that such inspections, when conducted without
an administrative inspection warrant, unlawfully weakened traditional
safeguards afforded by the fourth amendment.
The Court re-examined the basic arguments in Frank v. Maryland and
concluded that it should be overruled insofar as it had differentiated be-
tween the application of the fourth amendment in criminal, as opposed to
civil, searches and seizures. The Court agreed with the Frank majority's
view that routine, periodic inspections of premises for the purpose of main-
taining public health and safety are an important governmental function
and a necessary concomitant of modern life."' However, when it applied the
Frank-type "balancing of interests" test, it found that for several reasons
the scales had tipped in favor of the individual's rights of privacy and
security from governmental intrusions. First, it disagreed with the Frank
conclusion that the interests involved in such inspections were merely
"' Justice Goldberg replaced Justice Frankfurter in 1962, and was himself replaced by Justice
Fortas in 1965.
" E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), which was superseded by Warden, Md.
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); promulgation of the lineup trilogy: United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); and Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); and Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which expressly overruled both
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950).
76387 U.S. 523 (1967).
77387 U.S. 541 (1967).
78 See 387 U.S. at 527.
79385 U.S. 808 (1966).
8 See Waters, supra note 13, at 79.
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"peripheral" to the fourth amendment." Paralleling the reasoning of Judge
Prettyman in District of Columbia v. Little," the Court stated: "It is surely
anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of
criminal behavior."" Second, the Court said that even though inspections
are "hedged about with safeguards [and are] designed to make the least
possible demand on the individual occupant," he has "no way of knowing
of the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of
knowing if the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization.""
Further, the court stated that "the practical effect of this system is to leave
the occupant subject to the discretion of the officer in the field,"'  and to
require that the individual who wishes to determine the inspector's author-
ity do so only by exposing himself to possible civil and criminal penalties.
Finally, the Court stated that the need for warrantless administrative
searches was not absolutely essential to the continued effectiveness of fire,
health, and safety codes, and that such inspection programs could achieve
their goals within the confines of a reasonable search warrant requirement.
The Court, citing Scbmerber v. California," rejected the "public need"
argument for warrantless inspections, since it felt that a warrant would not
frustrate the governmental purpose behind the municipal searches in ques-
tion.
The Court then addressed itself to the "probable cause" element of
inspection warrants. It rejected the general "probable cause" test" normally
employed in searches for evidence of a crime. Noting with approval the
Frank Court's characterization of these inspections as "unique," the Court
set forth the ground rules for a new definition of "administrative probable
cause." These rules are designed to achieve the goals of the particular inspec-
tion while at the same time remaining "reasonable" within the limitations
of the fourth amendment. The Court felt that such "administrative prob-
able cause" requires not reasonable belief that a crime has been committed,
but proof of a "valid public interest [which] justifies the intrusion con-
templated . . . ."" The Court further stated that administrative "probable
cause to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are to be satis-
fied with respect to a particular dwelling."" Thus, where a search warrant
in a criminal action must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized, administrative inspection warrants aimed at secur-
8 387 U.S. at 530.
82 See notes 38-41 supra, and accompanying text.
8' 387 U.S. at 530.
84 1d. at 531-32.
15 id. at 532.
'6384 U.S. 757 (1966).
87"Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowl-
edge and over which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves
to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being com-
mitted. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). See also Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160 (1949); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
88387 U.S. at 539.
"Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
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ing general compliance with minimum fire, health, and safety standards
need only set out such general standards as "the passage of time, the nature
of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of
the entire area . . . ."" Consequently, "probable cause" for issuance of
administrative inspection warrants does "not necessarily depend upon spe-
cific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling." 1 The Court
brought up and summarily rejected the Frank view that a lesser form of
"probable cause" would lead to synthetic or "rubber stamp" warrants. It
stated that even though a lesser standard for such inspections would be
employed, even that reduced standard would carry the inherent limitations
necessary for meeting the fourth amendment requirement of "reasonable-
ness." By allowing a neutral party-a judicial officer-to pass upon the
scope and "probable cause" for such a warrant, the home owner could be
assured that the inspector was acting within his authority and not on a
personal whim."
As a final point, the Court excepted from the administrative warrant
requirement those emergency situations in which the law had traditionally
allowed warrantless searches. a But it noted that in the bulk of the routine
inspections contemplated there was "no compelling urgency to inspect at a
particular time or on a particular day."" It should be noted that the emer-
gency situation was in fact the Court's second exception to the requirement
of an administrative inspection warrant. The first exception, "consent,"
had been noted cryptically early in the opinion in the following general
statement: "Except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of
private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been
authorized by a valid search warrant."'" The Court, though it fully in-
tended to do so, never explained whether its term, "proper consent," was
the same as valid informed consent, and never was it expressly stated that
such consent was an exception to the requirement of an administrative in-
spection warrant. However, it would seem that if the Court assumed
"proper consent" to be an exception to the requirement of a valid conven-
tional search warrant, then a fortiori such consent would also be an excep-
tion to the requirement of an administrative inspection warrant.
Thus, the Court in Camara established the right of an individual to
require an administrative inspector to obtain his consent to search," or in
90 Id.
91 Id.
9 The fact that a warrant issues and must be returned to the court also creates psychological
restraints on the inspector conducting the inspection, and has the added advantage of engendering
self-imposed caution on the part of the inspector during such inspections.
9a 3 8 7 U.S. at 539.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 528-29 (emphasis added).
" In order to obtain such consent, there must be knowledge of the individual's right to refuse
the inspection and then a waiver of this right. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
Some courts have explored the issue of whether or not the warnings required in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), are required in order to obtain a valid consent. Two courts,
State v. Forney, 181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915 (1967), and People v. McCarty, 199 Kan. 116,
427 P.2d 616 (1967), have held that the Miranda warnings are not required for valid consent.
In United States v. Kushing, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 298 (1967), the United States court of military
appeals held that it did not feel that such warnings were required as the Supreme Court had not
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the alternative, to require the inspector to obtain an administrative inspec-
tion warrant which would limit the search to those areas authorized in that
warrant.
See v. City of Seattle,"7 which was argued with Camara and decided on
the same day, involved an attempt by an inspector to gain entrance to a
locked warehouse not open to the public. After the inspector was refused
entrance, the defendant was arrested and fined for violating a city ordi-
nance. On appeal, the Washington supreme court affirmed his conviction."
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, and extended the Camara
decision to prohibit inspection of any private area of a commercial estab-
lishment without a warrant. The Court noted that with mushrooming
governmental control, official entry upon commercial property by govern-
ment agencies to enforce a variety of regulatory laws requires some minimal
limitations to safeguard the individual businessman's fourth amendment
rights of privacy. In concluding that warrantless administrative inspections
were unconstitutional absent consent, the Court distinguished between
public and non-public areas of a commercial establishment, holding that
only non-public areas come within the fourth amendment protections."
The Court stated: "We therefore conclude that administrative entry,
without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not
open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical
force within the framework of a warrant procedure."'" The Court in See
was careful to note that it did not "imply that business premises may not
reasonably be inspected in many more situations than private homes," or
that administrative inspection requirements were applicable to "such ac-
cepted regulatory techniques as licensing programs which require inspec-
tions prior to operating a business or marketing a product. '0 1
Not long after Camara and See, two district court cases were decided
which distinguished similar warrantless searches from the holdings in
Camara and See. In United States v. Sessions"'a the United States District
yet extended the test to consent searches. This case split the three-man court, with the concurring
majority opinion resting principally on the lack of direction by the Supreme Court. See also
Virgin Is. v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). In United States
v. Moderachi, 280 F. Supp. 633 (D. Del. 1968), the Court required such warnings. It appears
that the Miranda rule is expanding to some degree. See Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968);
Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968). See also United States v. Wallace, 272 F. Supp. 841
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS, AGENTS' MANUAL § 6071.4
(1969).
97387 U.S. 541 (1967).
"
5See v. City of Seattle, 67 Wash. 2d 475, 408 P.2d 262 (1966).
"' There is a real question as to whether the Court intended to stick by this distinction between
public and non-public areas of a commercial establishment: Such arbitrary distinctions blurred
in the more recent decision of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), where the distinction
was made between the fourth amendment's protection of "persons, not places."
'00387 U.S. at 545.
'
1 1d. at 546-47. See also H.R. REP. No. 708, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. (1953); U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NIws 2198 (1953) (reporting the "factory inspection" amendments to the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 374 (1962)); Handler, The Constitutionality of Investi-
gations by the Federal Trade Commission (pts. I & II), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 905 (1928);
Note, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Tax Investigations 57 COLUM. L. REV. 676 (1957).
102283 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Ga. 1968). The case involved the owner of an Atlanta night club
known as "The Nitery Club." She was indicted for having sold liquor in violation of INT. REV.
CODE Of 1954, § 5301 (c). She was also indicted for possession of liquor bottles whose contents
had been altered, and for having carried on the business of a retail iquor dealer without having
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Court for the Northern District of Georgia upheld the right of entry by
liquor inspectors upon the premises of a night club serving liquor without
a liquor license, where the inspectors entered solely upon statutory au-
thority" and without a search warrant. The district court, distinguishing
Sessions from See v. City of Seattle,"4 stated that the final paragraph of the
See decision impliedly approved the search in question. In United States v.
Duffy'05 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress six liquor bottles
seized during a warrantless inspection, held that the defendant's statement,
"Go ahead," in reply to an inspection request by investigators of the Alco-
hol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service, amounted
to consent. 10 By way of dictum, the court, citing Sessions and the last
paragraph of the See decision, stated that Camara and See did not apply to
the instant situation.
Other lower court federal cases, however, have broadened the administra-
tive warrant protection in Camara and See. In United States v. Stanack
Sales Co."0 ' the Third Circuit court of appeals reversed the conviction of
the appellants in a situation in which the Food and Drug inspector had
proceeded to carry out his inspection of the defendant's drug factory with-
out a subpoena or search warrant and with only a written notice of inspec-
tion filled out by himself. Noting that the officers of Stanack had permitted
the inspector to enter the factory but had refused to allow him access to
receipt and distribution records, and further had refused to permit the in-
spector to obtain samples of the drugs on hand, the Court stated that a
paid the special tax levied on such dealers in accord with INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 5212.
Defendant made several pre-trial motions, one of which was for the suppression of the evidence
based on an illegal search in violation of the fourth amendment by investigators of the Alcohol
and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service, who entered the premises of the
night club solely under the authority of INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 5146, and without a search
warrant.
10a (a) Preservation and inspection of records.-Any records or other documents re-
quired to be kept under this part or regulations issued thereto shall be preserved by
the person required to keep such records or documents, as the Secretary or his delegate
may by regulation prescribe, and shall be kept available for inspection by any
internal revenue officer during business hours.
(b) Entry of premises for inspection.-The Secretary or his deleagte may enter
during business hours the premises (including places of storage) of any dealer for
the purpose of inspecting or examining any records or other documents required to
be kept by such dealer under this chapter or regulations issued pursuant thereto and
any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept or stored by such dealer on such premises.
INT. REV. COonE of 1954, § 5146.
10 We therefore conclude that administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions
of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled
through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure.
We do not in any way imply that business premises may not reasonably be inspected
in many more situations than private homes, nor do we question such accepted
regulatory techniques as licensing programs which require inspections prior to operat-
ing a business or marketing a product. Any constitutional challenge to such programs
can only be resolved, as many have been in the past, on a case-by-case basis under
the general Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness.
387 U.S. at 545.
105282 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
.. There is a question as to the validity of this "consent" where a law enforcement officer
by claiming authority to search a particular premises is in effect announcing to the occupant
that he has no right to resist the search. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
107387 F.2d 849 (3d Cir. 1968).
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waiver of an individual's fourth amendment rights in an administrative
inspection had to be clear and intentional. The court then stated that it was
hesitant to find a waiver for both inspection of books and the area searched,
where it was not even clear that consent to search the entire area had been
given. About a year later, in January 1969, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, in United States v. J. B. Kramer
Grocery Co.,"'8 reiterated the Stanack. Sales doctrine by stressing the neces-
sity of voluntariness of consent to waive fourth amendment protections in
administrative inspection situations.
In reversing an appeals court decision which restricted Camara and See,
the Supreme Court itself, in February 1970, amplified the doctrine of those
cases. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States.9 the Second Circuit
had cited Duffy and Sessions as justification for carving out an exception
to the requirements of Camara and See."' The facts of the case were that
on the afternoon of May 18, 1968, three special investigators of the Internal
Revenue Service, accompanied by a Nassau County policeman, entered
Colonnade's premises while a party was in progress and liquor was being
served. Their purpose was to determine if Colonnade possessed any liquor
bottles which had been illegally refilled or altered. After inspecting the
ballroom, the agents checked the basement. Finding a locked storeroom
in the basement, the agents stated that they wanted to inspect it. Colon-
nade's president was called to the scene. Upon his refusal to open the door,
the agents broke the lock, entered, and seized liquor and funnels. The
United States district court suppressed the evidence as having been ob-
tained through a forcible warrantless inspection of the type prohibited
under the fourth amendment as interpreted in Camara and See. The court
of appeals reversed the decision suppressing the evidence, distinguishing
Camara and See on four grounds: first, the scope of the search authorized
by the statutes in Colonnade was much narrower than the statutory grant
in Camara and See; second, dealers in a heavily regulated business, such as
liquor distribution, are aware of the nature and limits of the inspector's
authority; third, the public interest in alcohol tax inspections would be
hindered or prejudiced by the warrant procedure; and fourth, the narrowly
drawn statute itself imposes the restrictions that a warrant imposes on other
searches."' On February 25, 1970, the Supreme Court reversed."' The
Court held that, absent emergency or exceptional circumstances, and ab-
sent specific congressional mandate, forced warrantless administrative
inspections were in violation of the fourth amendment's "reasonableness"
limitation on searches and seizures. After the promulgation. of Colonnade
by the court of appeals, it was felt that the Camara and See decisions were
to be very narrowly construed by the lower courts in an attempt to leave
discretion as to the reasonableness of the inspection in the inspectors."'
108 294 F. Supp. 6$ (E.D. Ark. 1969j.
M°410 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1969).
110 See text accompanying notes 102-06 supra.
' 410 F.2d at 200-02.
"2Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
"' United States v. Duffy, 282 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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However, the Supreme Court's decision in Colonnade made it quite clear
that, beyond those set forth in Camara, only a few exceptions to the
requirement of an administrative inspection warrant would be tolerated.
The Court, however, did add one further exception by stating that if Con-
gress clearly set forth not only its intention under the liquor laws to author-
ize warrantless inspections in order to "meet the evils at hand," but also
set forth the procedure by which inspectors were obliged to carry out such
inspections, then the restrictions inhering in the fourth amendment require-
ment of "reasonableness" would be deemed to have been satisfied."114
It must be noted, however, that in Colonnade the Supreme Court was
addressing itself primarily to the situation where there was a possibility
that a forcible entry, no matter how slight, might have to be made. It was
such a situation that the Supreme Court wished to protect with a warrant-
type procedure. And although the Court seemed to be saying that Congress
could, by appropriate legislative mandates, eliminate administrative war-
rants in all situations, it must be realistically assumed that they did not
intend to exclude from the situations in which a warrant is required those
in which force might possibly come into play.1 ' The Court, quoting from
the See decision, stated with respect to situations like Colonnade, in which
force is contemplated, that "this Nation's traditions are strongly opposed
to using force without definite authority to break down doors. . . .Con-
gress has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches
and seizures. Under the existing statutes, Congress selected a standard that
does not include forcible entries without a warrant.'"
Since administrative inspections involving narcotics and dangerous drugs
also carry with them the possibility of forcible entry, the most logical con-
stitutional approach would be to require administrative inspection warrants
in all situations where voluntary informed consent is not given, or where
the "emergency circumstances" alluded to by the Supreme Court in
Camara do not exist. To clarify the perimeters of the administrative in-
spection area when the proposed Controlled Dangerous Substances Act was
being drafted, it was felt necessary to establish a clear procedure for obtain-
ing entry to inspect inventories and records of registrants under the federal
narcotic and dangerous drug laws and, at the same time, to establish the
limits of the scope and timing of such searches." ' The need for clarification
"" 397 U.S. at 76-77.
i'5 See See v. City of Seattle, which stated, "We therefore conclude that administrative entry,
without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may
only be compelled through prosecution of physical force within the framework of a warrant
procedure." 387 U.S. 523, 545 (1967).
"a 397 U.S. at 77.
"'The Controlled Dangerous Substances Act has passed the Senate as S. 3246 by a vote of
82-0, and is presently pending in the House of Representatives. The original administration ver-
sion, introduced into the Senate as S. 2637, was also introduced into the House of Representatives
as H.R. 13743 (Dangerous Drugs) and H.R. 13742 (Narcotics and Marihuana). [The House
bill was bifurcated due to the fact that the House Ways and Means Committee had original
jurisdiction over all narcotics and marihuana laws, and the House Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce Committee had original jurisdiction over dangerous drugs under the Drug Abuse Control
Amendments of 1965.] While no action has been taken on S. 3246, hearings have been completed
on H.R. 13743 by the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Subcommittee on Public Health,
and a vote is imminent.
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was clear in light of the trend of various district court decisions such as
Sessions and Duffy, and also in light of the hesitancy in the face of uncer-
tainty as to the real intent of Camara and See, to grant this special breed of
warrant. The Colonnade case laid to rest any doubts with regard to the
Court's direction, and added impetus to the need for clear congressional
direction in this area.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTION WARRANTS UNDER THE
PROPOSED CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES ACT OF 1969
The proposed Controlled Dangerous Substances Act contemplates a
closed system of drug manufacture, import and export, and distribution,
and a closed system of research on narcotics and dangerous drugs. While a
The general purpose of the proposed Controlled Dangerous Substances Act is to consolidate
and rationalize the patchwork of existing legislation and to bring about some needed changes so
that our basic federal statutory tool is as effective and as up-to-date as possible. The bill repre-
sents a codification, a modernization, and a simplification of existing federal narcotic and drug
laws. The bill consists of nine titles.
Title I sets out the constitutional basis on which this legislation is to be grounded, namely,
the authority of Congress to control interstate and foreign commerce. In addition, title I also
contains the many definitions necessary for the successful implementation of the bill.
Title II of the bill vests the authority to control those drugs enumerated as controlled dangerous
substances in the Attorney General. He may add, delete, or reschedule a drug within any one
of the four schedules listed, either upon his own motion or that of any interested party. However,
before undertaking to bring a drug under control or remove a drug from control, the Attorney
General must first consider the advice of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and
that of the Scientific Advisory Committee established under title VI of the bill. As well as pro-
viding for the necessary scientific and medical input into the Attorney General's determination
to control a drug, nine criteria are set out which he must consider before bringing any substance
under control. All the drugs subject to control are listed in one of four schedules. Each schedule
has its own set of criteria and any drug must meet these criteria before it can be included
within the particular schedule.
Title III sets forth the provisions which govern the legitimate manufacture, distribution, and
dispensing of controlled dangerous substances. All persons, except those few specifically exempted,
who manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled dangerous substances must register with the
Attorney General. There are also provisions allowing for a suspension or revocation of a registration
by the Attorney General.
Title IV sets out the provisions relating to the importation and exportation of drugs under
control. In addition, new and stiffer restrictions are imposed upon the exportation of any con-
trolled dangerous substance. Such restrictions are aimed at decreasing the flow of illicit drugs at
this country's borders, especially in the situation which exists now where drugs are legitimately
exported from this country only to be smuggled back in and distributed into illicit channels.
Title V sets out the penalties imposed for violations of the various provisions of the Act. It
should be noted that section 502 of Title V relates to offenses committed by registrants. If the
offense is committed unknowingly or unintentionally, only civil fines are imposed. However, for
willful violations, criminal sanctions will be imposed.
Title VI sets out the administrative provisions necessary for the successful implementation of
the bill. Of key importance are the sections authorizing the Attorney General to conduct educa-
tional and research programs and establish coperative arrangements between federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies. Other provisions provide for the establishment of the Scientific
Advisory Committee, which will advise the Attorney General as to the merits of bringing a par-
ticular drug under control, administrative hearings, the issuance of subpoenas, and judicial review.
Title VII contains perhaps the most controversial provision in the entire bill, namely the pro-
visions authorizing officers under certain circumstances to execute a search warrant without knock-
ing or announcing their authority and purpose. Other provisions which provide for administrative
inspections and warrants and for the forfeiture of the vehicles used by the drug trafficker will
contribute most significantly to the effective enforcement of this bill.
Title VIII calls for the establishment of a Committee on Marihuana to carry out a study on
all phases of marihuana use. This committee is to be composed of experts with diversified pro-
fessional backgrounds.
Title IX, the last title of the bill, sets out the various technical provisions such as repealers,
conforming amendments, sections continuing pending proceedings and regulations, a section for
authorization of appropriations, and a severability clause.
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closed system of registration has always been the purpose of narcotic drug
legislation, the same is not true under the Drug Abuse Control Amend-
ments of 1965,"' which exempted certain individuals and distributors and
did not require registration."' Under the proposed legislation, all persons
other than ultimate users' and employees, agents,
12
' and common carriers12
will register annually' a and are subject to inspection, both prior to, and
after, registering.12 The purposes of such inspections are to keep tabs on the
flow of these drugs, to allow law enforcement personnel to spot points of
diversion into the illicit drug traffic, and to insure that there are adequate
safeguards to protect against theft.
Section 703 of the proposed Controlled Dangerous Substances Act pro-
vides for an administrative inspection warrant procedure for inspection of
legitimate registrants under the narcotic and dangerous drug laws.'' It was
drafted to ensure adequate regulation of all registrants, including such
groups as the drug manufacturers, wholesalers, pharmacists, dispensing
physicians, hospitals, and researchers. It carefully delineates what is needed
to obtain administrative inspection warrants; it assures that a uniform
standard will be applied by the courts when administrative inspection
warrants are sought; and, most importantly, it sets out, in language which
lends a degree of certainty to those registrants being inspected, exactly what
their rights and obligations are under the law and the scope of the inspec-
tion that can be conducted. Because criminal penalties as well as civil
sanctions may be imposed upon the refusal of a registrant to allow his office
or establishment to be inspected,' as was the case in the See and Colonnade
"821 U.S.C. §§ 360, 360a, 360b (1964).
19Id. § 360(g) sets out the following persons who need not register:
(1) pharmacies which maintain establishments in conformance with any applicable
local laws regulating the practice of pharmacy and medicine and which are regularly
engaged in dispensing prescription drugs, upon prescriptions of practitioners licensed
to administer such drugs to patients under the care of such practitioners in the course
of their professional practice, and which do not manufacture, prepare, propagate,
compound, or process drugs for sale other than in the regular course of their business
of dispensing or selling drugs at retail;
(2) practitioners licensed by law to prescribe or administer drugs and who manufac-
ture, prepare, propagate, compound, or process drugs solely for use in the course
of their professional practice;
(3) persons who manufacture, prepare, propagate, compound, or process drugs solely
for use in research, teaching, or chemical analysis and not for sale;
(4) such other classes of persons as the Secretary may by regulation exempt from
the application of this section upon a finding that registration by such classes of
persons in accordance with this section is not necessary for the protection of the pub-
lic health.
t0 Proposed Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, S. 3246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 302 (b) (3)
(1970).
11Id. § 302(b) (1).
1




'2 See note 4 supra.
"2 Prohibited Acts B, 5 502(a) (7), (c), which provide for both civil and criminal penalties
for refusal to allow administrative inspections, read as follows: § 502(a) (7): "to refuse any
entry into any premises or inspection authorized by this Act." § 502 (c) :
.Any person who violates this section is punishable by a civil fine of not more than
$25,000: Provided, That if the violation is prosecuted by an information or indict-
ment which alleges that the violation was committed knowingly or intentionally,
and the trier of fact specifically finds that the violation was committed knowingly or
intentionally, such person is punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year,
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cases, the fourth amendment limitation of "reasonableness" is applied to
administrative inspections under section 703. A section 703 administrative
inspection will be constitutionally "reasonable" under the Camara, See, or
Colonnade line of reasoning, because section 703 provides for an inspection
warrant to be issued only upon a finding by a judge or United States magis-
trate of "administrative probable cause," defined as "a valid public interest
in the effective enforcement of the Act or regulations sufficient to justify
administrative inspection of the area, premises, building or conveyance in
the circumstances specified in the application for the warrant."'2 7
This part of section 703 has been patterned very closely after rule 41 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2 ' However, section 703 is not
or a fine of not more than $25,000, or both.
S. 3246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 502(a) (7), (c) (1970).
.27 Compare this language with the Court's statement in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 535 (1967), which stated: "In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable-
and thus in determining whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection-
the need for inspection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement."
And id. at 539: "If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is
probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant." (Emphasis added.)
128 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41:
Search and Seizure. (a) Authority to Issue Warrant. A search warrant authorized
by this rule may be issued by a judge of the United States or of a state, common-
wealth, or territorial court of record or by a United States commissioner within the
district wherein the property sought is located. (b) Grounds for Issuance. A warrant
may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any property (1) Stolen or
embezzled in violation of the laws of the United States; or (2) Designed or intended
for use or which is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense;
or (3) Possessed, controlled, or designed or intended for use or which is or has been
used in violation of Title 18, U.S.C., § 957. (c) Issuance and Contents. A warrant
shall issue only on affidavit sworn to before the judge or commissioner and establishing
the grounds for issuing the warrant. If the judge or commissioner is satisfied that
grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they
exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the property and naming or describing the
person or place to be searched. The warrant shall be directed to a civil officer of the
United States authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing any law thereof or to a
person so authorized by the President of the United States. It shall state the grounds
or probable cause for its issuance and the names of the persons whose affidavits have
been taken in support thereof. It shall command the officer to search forthwith the
person or place named for the property specified. The warrant shall direct that it be
served in the daytime, but if the affidavits are positive that the property is on the
person or in the place to be searched, the warrant may direct that it be served at any
time. It shall designate the district judge or the commissioner to whom it shall be
returned. (d) Execution and Return with Inventory. The warrant may be executed
and returned only within 10 days after its date. The officer taking property under
the warrant shall give to the person from whom or from whose premises the property
was taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken or shall leave
the copy and receipt at the place from which the property was taken. The return
shall be made promptly and shall be accompanied by a written inventory of any
property taken. The inventory shall be made in the presence of the applicant for
the warrant and the person from whose possession or premises the property was taken,
if they are present, or in the presence of at least one credible person other than the
applicant for the warrant or the person from whose possession or premises the prop-
erty was taken, and shall be verified by the officer. The judge or commissioner shall
upon request deliver a copy of the inventory to the person from whom or from whose
premises the property was taken and to the applicant for the warrant. (e) Motion for
Return of Property and To Suppress Evidence. A person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure may move the district court for the district in which the property
was seized for the return of the property and to suppress for the use as evidence
anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was illegally seized without
warrant, or (2) the warrant is insufficient on its face, or (3) the property seized
is not that described in the warrant, or (4) there was not probable cause for believing
the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, or (5) the warrant was
illegally executed. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary
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directed solely toward gathering evidence of a crime, as is rule 41. Rather,
its primary aim is to allow a periodic check on registrants' activities, such
as manufacturing, storing, recordkeeping, processes, controls, and inven-
tory. Thus, the "probable cause" element has been modified. Using the
Camara and See reasoning, this section does not require the inspector to
state what he intends to search for or seize, but rather allows him to show
that he intends to search solely to maintain the minimal health and safety
standards imposed by the proposed act."'9 Under rule 41, the affiant must
establish "grounds" for issuance of a search warrant.'80 But under the
Camara-See rationale, there are already statutory "grounds" for the war-
rant, and so specifiic findings are not necessary.
Section 703 also differs from rule 41 in that administrative inspection
warrants can only be served during normal business hours, whereas under
the conditions specified by rule 41 (c), a nighttime warrant can be issued."'
The reason for this is that administrative searches are far more restricted
in scope than the routine searches for evidence of criminal activity or con-
duct. The administrative inspections are necessarily tied to business hours
so that the records can be properly inspected.
Section 703 (a) (3), which is identical to rule 41 (d), pertains to execu-
tion of the warrant and special procedures by which questionable inventory
is to be seized."' There is no apparent reason for differing from accepted
practice for routine search warrants. Conforming to the usual pattern will
avoid court administrative problems, since the inspection warrant will be
filed and handled in the same manner as other warrants. Section 703 (a) -
(4), which speaks to the return of the warrant after service, and of the
inventory after completion, is also identical to rule 41.18" The same consider-
ations mentioned above dictated the similarity in this area.
Section 703 (b) of the proposed act attempts to invoke the spirit of
Camara, See, and Colonnade by carefully setting forth the perimeters of
to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted the property shall be restored
unless otherwise subject to lawful detention and it shall not be admissible in evidence
at any hearing or trial. The motion to suppress evidence may also be made in the dis-
trict where the trial is to be had. The motion shall be made before trial or hearing
unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the
grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at
the trial or hearing. (f) Return of Papers to Clerk. The judge or commissioner who
has issued a search warrant shall attach to the warrant a copy of the return, inven-
tory and all other papers in connection therewith and shall file them with the clerk
of the district court for the district in which the property was seized. (g) Scope and
Definition. This rule does not modify any act, inconsistent with it, regulating search,
seizure and the issuance and execution of search warrants in circumstances for which
special provision is made. The term 'property' is used in this rule to include docu-
ments, books, papers and any other tangible objects.
29See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 531, 535-37 (1967).
125See note 128 supra.
.s The "positivity" requirement for nighttime warrants in rule 41 reads as follows: "[I]f the
affidavits are positive that the property is on the person or in the place to be searched, the warrant
may direct that it be served at any time." FED. R. CrM. P. 41(c).
'a' FED. R. CRsM. P. 41 (d).
"'FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (e), supra note 128. It should be noted that while no one but author-
ized inspectors may avail themselves of § 703 (a), any law enforcement officer charged with en-
forcement of the Act may obtain a conventional search warrant under rule 41 to search the
premises of a registrant if he has the required grounds for inspection under rule 41(b), or has
criminal "probable cause" to so search. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
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an administrative inspection warrant. For example, it will limit by con-
gressional mandate the premises which can be inspected to "places where
persons registered or exempted"' from registration requirements under
[the] Act are required to keep records; and places including factories,
warehouses, establishments, and conveyances where persons who are regis-
tered or exempted from registration requirements under [the] Act are
permitted to hold, manufacture, compound, process, sell, deliver, or other-
wise dispose of any controlled dangerous substance." This narrowing of the
application of administrative inspection warrants will preclude the use of
these warrants as "door-opening" devices against non-registrants who are
illegally manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing controlled dangerous
substances.' It will also place the "controlled premises" owners or man-
agers on notice that they are subject to periodic, routine inspections. Sec-
tions 703 (b) (2) and 703 (b) (3) explain to the owner of the "controlled
premises" the administrative inspector's authority and limitations. This
language, which closely parallels in intent the language in subsections 3 60a-
(d) (2) (A) and (B) of the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 19651"
" There are some establishments and persons that will be exempted from registering, such as
military doctors overseas. Also, during domestic emergency situations, such as floods or other
natural disasters, persons normally not involved in distributing these drugs may be authorized to
so distribute them by the federal government without their having to meet the registration criteria.
' This represents a full turnabout from the several pre-Colonnade cases which had used ad-
ministrative inspectors' authority to secure evidence of failure to register. This section also ex-
pressly limits the application of administrative inspection warrants for any other purpose than in-
spection, contrary to fears expressed by the American Civil Liberties Union at Hearings on S.
3246 Before the Subcomm. on Public Health of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). E.g., United States v. Sessions, 283 F. Supp. 746 (N.D.
Ga. 1968). In addition, this section does not severely inhibit law enforcement, since conventional
search warrants are still obtainable if Carroll-type probable cause to search can be shown. Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
136 Sections 360a(d) (2) (A), (B) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act are part of the Drug
Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, which now regulate amphetamines, barbiturates, and hallu-
cinogenic substances, and reads as follows:
Every person required by paragraph (1) of this subsection to prepare or obtain, and
keep, records, and any carrier maintaining records with respect to any shipment con-
taining any depressant or stimulant drug, and every person in charge, or having cus-
tody, of such records, shall, upon request of an officer or employee designated by
the Secretary permit such officer or employee at reasonable times to have access to
and copy such records. For the purposes of verification of such records and of en-
forcement of this section, officers or employees designated by the Secretary are author-
ized, upon presenting appropriate credentials and a written notice to the owner,
operator, or agent in charge, to enter, at reasonable times, any factory, warehouse,
establishment, or vehicle in which any depressant or stimulant drug is held, manu-
factured, compounded, processed, sold, delivered, or otherwise disposed of and to
inspect, within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, such factory, warehouse,
establishment, or vehicle, and all pertinent equipment, finished and unfinished
material, containers and labeling therein, and all things therein (including records,
files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities) bearing on violation of this section or
section 331(q) of this title; and to inventory any stock of any such drug therein
and obtain samples of any such drug. If a sample is thus obtained, the officer or
employee making the inspection shall, upon completion of the inspection and before
leaving the premises, give to the owner, operator, or agent in charge a receipt describ-
ing the sample obtained. (B) No inspection authorized by subparagraph (A) shall
extend to (i) financial data, (ii) sales data other than shipment data, (iii) pricing
data, (iv) personnel data, or (v) research data, which are exempted from inspection
under the third sentence of section 374(a) of this title.
21 U.S.C. §§ 360a(d) (2) (A), (B) (1964).
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to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and section 374 of the same Act,"'
which provides:
(2) When so authorized by an administrative inspection warrant issued
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, an officer or employee designated
by the Attorney General, upon presenting the warrant and appropriate cre-
dentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, shall have the right to
enter controlled premises for the purpose of conducting an administrative
inspection.
(3) When so authorized by an administrative inspection warrant, an officer
or employee designated by the Attorney General shall have the right-
(a) to inspect and copy records required by this Act to be kept;
(b) to inspect, within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner,
controlled premises and all pertinent equipment, finished and unfinished
material, containers and labelling found therein, and, except as pro-
vided in subsection (b) (5) of this section, all other things therein
(including records, files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities) bear-
ing on violation of this Act; and
(c) to inventory any stock of any controlled dangerous substance there-
in and obtain samples of any such substance.
Although section 374 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act has not itself
been directly tested constitutionally, it has been held to be reasonable in
Durovic v. Palmer."' This case involved an inspection of Promak Labora-
tories and a request for samples of the drug "Krebiozen." Instead of supply-
ing the drug, Durovic sought a mandatory injunction requiring the inspec-
tors to discontinue their inspections and investigation of the drug. The
Seventh Circuit court of appeals, upholding the grant of a summary judg-
ment against Durovic, stated that the wording of 21 U.S.C. 374, which
authorized inspections to be conducted "at reasonable times and within
reasonable limits in a reasonable manner," did not interfere with Durovic's
fourth amendment rights, as those rights compelled a strict application of
the statutory "reasonableness" requirements."'9 In addition, section 374 is
similar to an earlier version of the same section which was generally held
constitutional in United States v. Crescent-Kelvan Co., and was specifi-
cally held not to violate the fourth amendment in United States v. Car-
diff."' Cardiff, a 1951 case, involved the defendant's refusal to submit to
an inspection of his factory. The court stated that "the inspections must
1 Inspection-Right of agents to enter premises; notice; promptness (a) For purposes
of enforcement of this chapter, officers or employees duly designated by the Secretary,
upon presenting appropriate credentials and a written notice to the owner, operator,
or agent in charge, are authorized (1) to enter, at reasonable times, any factory,
warehouse, or establishment in which food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics are manu-
factured, processed, packed, or held, for introduction into interstate commerce or
after such introduction, or to enter any vehicle being used to transport or hold such
food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics in interstate commerce; and (2) to inspect, at
reasonable times and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, such factory,
warehouse, establishment, or vehicle and all pertinent equipment, finished and un-
finished materials, containers, and labeling therein ....
21 U.S.C. § 374 (1962).
38 342 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965).
sas1d, at 636.
140 164 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1948).
14195 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Wash. 1951).
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be made at reasonable times but the right to inspect is necessary to carry
out the purposes of this Act. Without it, there is no positive protection to
the public. 14 The court went on to hold that section 374, which contains
the reasonableness limitations for inspections under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, did therefore not violate the fourth amendment. In addition,
section 360a has been generally held to be constitutional in United States
v. Erlin.'"
It should also be noted that section 703 (b) (5) of the proposed act
includes provisions similar to those found in sections 374 and 360a(d) (2)
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which prohibit inspection of finan-
cial data, sales data other than shipment, or pricing data, which the owner
of the "controlled premises" has not authorized in writing.
14
Finally section 703 (b) (4) of the proposed act sets forth those situa-
tions in which an administrative inspection warrant is not required.4
Section 703 (b) (4) (a) allows the owner, operator, or agent in charge
of a "controlled premises" to consent to an inspection. Obviously, as noted
earlier, this consent must be voluntary, and it must be informed.'" Based
on the Supreme Court's past actions in requiring voluntariness of consent
in various criminal cases, it would seem that in extending the protections
of the fourth amendment to the administrative inspection situation, the
Court is going to be fairly strict in requiring a voluntary informed consent.
Even though the potential for criminal sanctions exists, it is doubtful
whether the Court will require Miranda14  warnings for such inspection.
It is assumed that the Court will restrict the full Miranda warnings to
custodial situations and not get back into the difficult area of "focus on the
accused.''8
Section 703 (b) (4) (c), which involves inspections of conveyances
"where there is reasonable cause to believe that the mobility of the con-
veyance makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant," recognizes a long
series of cases beginning with Carroll v. United States.'4 In that case, the
United States Supreme Court determined that the fourth amendment al-
lowed distinctions as to the need for warrants in searches of private dwell-
ings and in searches of automobiles. The Court set up a "reasonable
grounds" rule for the search and seizure of an automobile. That case was
followed by Brinegar v. United States, which stated: "The rule of probable
cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise
that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests.
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less
would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim
142Id. at 208.
1283 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
'44See notes 136-37 supra.
'521 U.S.C. § 374 (1962).
146 387 F.2d at 853; 294 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Ark. 1969). See generally Baumgartner, The Effect
of Drugs on Criminal Responsibility, Specific Intent, and Mental Competency, 8 AM. CRIM. L.Q.
118 (1970).
147 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
149 Id. at 477.
"'1267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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or caprice...... The Court went on to state that no problem of searching
the home or any other place of privacy was presented in either Carroll or
the instant case. The Court said the instant case turned on whether there
was a right to be unmolested by investigation and searches in the use of
public highways in swiftly moving vehicles dealing in contraband. The
Court stated that the citizen that has given no good cause for believing that
he is engaged in that sort of activity is entitled to proceed on his way
without interference, but one who recently has given substantial ground
for believing that he is engaging in the forbidden transportation in the area
of his usual operations has no such immunity. Brinegar was reinforced by
Cooper v. California... and Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing
Co.1"' All four cases serve as the basis for section 703 (b) (4) (c) of the
proposed Controlled Dangerous Substances Act.
Sections 703 (b) (4) (b) and 703 (b) (4) (d) speak of exceptions to the
administrative warrant inspection procedure in situations presenting immi-
nent danger to health and safety and in any other exceptional or emergency
circumstances where time or opportunity to apply for a warrant is lack-
ing. This is really a codification of the "emergency" exception set forth in
Camara: "Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard of reason-
ableness, nothing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections,
even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emer-
gency situations.""1 '
Lastly, section 703 (b) (4) (e) includes as an exception to the adminis-
trative warrant requirement "all other situations where a warrant is not
constitutionally required." This part has been included to make the pro-
posed act extensible with changing attitudes of the Supreme Court. If the
Court grants further exceptions to the fourth amendment requirements
of administrative inspection warrants, then the statute, through this clause,
will not be limited by its own inflexible rules. Instead, it will retain that
flexibility which is part of the entire concept of the proposed Controlled
Dangerous Substances Act.
III. CONCLUSION
This then is an explanation of section 703 of the proposed Controlled
Dangerous Substances Act. Its design is predicated on the Supreme Court's
ground-breaking decisions in Camara and See, which have been further
cemented by the Colonnade case. The proposed act in its section on admin-
istrative inspection warrants meets constitutional requirements and permits
both the inspected and the inspectors knowledge of the availability and
10338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
'5 3 8 6 U.S. 58 (1967).
"2 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
'5 387 U.S. at 539. The Court cited the following cases as examples of emergency situations
where a compelling urgency required that the inspection be made without an administrative in-
spection warrant: North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation Vapeur v. Louisiana




scope of administrative inspections. The very presence of the section de-
flates the common belief that the establishment of a rule"5 4 which makes
failure to allow inspection of records a criminal offense means that a person
must allow inspection upon request. This belief has persisted despite
Camara and See. By establishing an administrative inspection warrant pro-
cedure, it becomes clear to all that the individual's mere failure to consent
to inspection will not invoke the prohibition. Only when there is a refusal
to allow inspection after a warrant is obtained is there the possibility of
civil or criminal action,"'
Several questions however still remain unanswered. In deciding Camara
and See, the Court did not really discuss the applicability of other search
and seizure doctrines. What, for example, will be the result when the
inspector observes the commission or evidence of the commission of other
crimes? In such instances, especially when dealing with mere evidence of
another crime, does the inspector have the same rights to seize as he would
under a routine search warrant"' or is he precluded from exercising those
rights by the far looser "probable cause" needed to obtain the administra-
tive warrant? Would seizure of such items give rise to the cry of using the
administrative warrant with its lower standard to conduct "fishing expedi-
tions"? This is an issue that has been raised, and, while it is assumed such
seizure would be permitted under general search and seizure principles," 7
it is still unclear whether the Court will further isolate administrative in-
spections and separate them from such principles, as it did in the case of
redefining "probable cause" for such inspections.
Other questions remain as to the observance by the inspector in the
course of his inspection of technical violations of the proposed Controlled
Dangerous Substances Act. One, such question is whether the inspector,
upon finding a technical violation of the Act, is required to recite the
Miranda warnings, even though he may not arrest the individual. Two
factors militate against such warnings. First, while there is the possibility
of a criminal sanction for the knowing or intentional violation of section
502, normally only a civil action would be brought against the individual
under section 502. Second, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
would usually conduct a preliminary administrative, noncriminal, hearing
against the individual under section 706. Section 706 reads:
Before any violation of this Act is reported by the Director of the Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to any United States Attorney for institu-
5421 U.S.C. § 331(f) (1962); INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 4773. The Controlled Dangerous
Substances Act has a similar provision (§ 502(a) (6)), but it is conditioned on that Act's § 703.
..' The proposed Controlled Dangerous Substances Act provides for civil penalties for refusal
to allow inspection unless such refusal is with criminal intent, which must be proved. In such
cases the penalties are imprisonment of up to one year, a fine of $25,000, or both. Under existing
law (21 U.S.C. § 333 (1960)), covering dangerous drugs other than narcotics and marihuana,
criminal penalties imposed are imprisonment of up to one year, a fine of $1,000, or both. As for
narcotics and marihuana, INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7203 provides that refusal to allow inspec-
tion or supply information as required by the Harrison Narcotic Act, INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§5 4704-05, subjects the registrant to a fine of $10,000, imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both.
.
5See generally Warden, Md. Pentitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
.. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
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tion of a criminal proceeding, the Director may require that the person against
whom such proceeding is contemplated be given appropriate notice and an
opportunity to present his views, either orally or in writing, with regard to
such contemplated proceeding. 5 '
If either of the two aforementioned routes are contemplated by the inspec-
tor, there seems to be no need for the Miranda warnings unless and until
it becomes clear to him that his only course of action is criminal prosecu-
tion.
These two considerations are offset by Mathis v. United States,5" which
states that when, in an investigation of a civil matter, there exists the
possibility of criminal sanctions even though not contemplated, the person
being interrogated must receive the Miranda warnings. Nowhere in Camara
or See does the Court speak on the point at which Miranda safeguards must
be invoked. The fourth amendment search and seizure limitation is applied
solely because of the potential imposition of criminal sanctions. It is, there-
fore, a source of puzzlement for the Supreme Court to have addressed itself
to the need for constitutional safeguards and yet to have failed to contem-
plate at what point such safeguards must be invoked. As a practical matter,
however, most compliance investigations carried on by the Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs are of the accountability survey type, in which
the investigator has no idea of culpability, or lack thereof, by a registrant
until he has completed actual inspection and begins to organize the raw
data. But, where the inspector, during the course of an inspection, becomes
suspicious of activity which could possibly lead to criminal action, or where
he begins an inspection based on some prior knowledge of misdoings, then
Mathis would seem to require that the individual being inspected receive
the Miranda warnings.5
One final question remains. If, during the course of a consent inspection,
the inspector observes criminal conduct relating to the Controlled Dan-
gerous Substances Act and takes appropriate action by arresting the regis-
trant on the spot, is the consent then vitiated and must the inspector with-
draw and secure an administrative inspection warrant or a conventional
search warrant to continue the investigation? Is consent vitiated when the
inspector observes criminal activity unrelated to the Controlled Dangerous
Substances Act? If, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court continues to include
administrative inspections within a broadened area of fourth amendment
protections, then it appears that voluntary, informed consent for an admin-
'
5 Section 706 of S. 3246 is almost identical to 21 U.S.C. § 335 (1938) (Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act) with one exception. Where 21 U.S.C. § 335 (1938) bases the mandatory language
"shall be given appropriate notice and an opportunity to present his views," § 706 of S. 3246
uses the term "may." This is because a 1943 case, United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277
(1943), held that the term "shall" in 21 U.S.C. § 335 (1938) was not mandatory language and
did not require an administrative hearing as a prerequisite to a criminal prosecution for violations
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Section 706 of S. 3246 by using the term "may" makes the
Dotterweich decision clear.
'"9 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
"'Based on this reasoning, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, in its Agents'
Manual, requires Miranda warnings to be given to a registrant even when he is interrogated before
an administrative hearing. See BUREAU oF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS, AGENTS' MANUAL
§ 6071.4 (1969).
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istrative inspection will be vitiated when any criminal sanctions by the
inspector become a possibility.
It would seem that in raising these questions, as yet unanswered or
focused upon by the Supreme Court, we have come full circle. While
Camara, See, and Colonnade attempt to set up the macroscopic parameters
relating to administrative inspection warrants, this area of the law is still far
from settled. What is needed now is a more intensive examination by the
Court of these types of questions so that the inspector in the field can fill
in the blanks of his authority while operating within the framework of the
Court's already-established, administrative inspection procedures.
